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James D. Kroger died of electrocution when a nearby steel 
crane came into contact with a utility line.1  His widow filed a 
wrongful death suit in federal court against Owen Equipment 
and Erection Company (“Owen”), arguing that Owen’s crane 
contributed to her husband’s death.2  Mrs. Kroger invoked 
diversity jurisdiction by alleging that Owen was “a Nebraska 
corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska,” 
while she resided in Iowa.3  In its answer, Owen admitted its 
incorporation under Nebraska law, but denied everything else.4  
At that time, Mrs. Kroger and her attorneys did not suspect 
any defect in jurisdiction. 
The case proceeded.  Pleadings closed.  Discovery ended.  
Trial began.  Then, three days into trial, a surprise.  Owen’s 
counsel called Owen’s Secretary, one Mr. Petersen, to the 
stand.5  Mr. Petersen testified that Owen’s principal place of 
business was in Iowa, not Nebraska.6  That meant that an 
Iowa plaintiff had sued an Iowa defendant, and diversity was 
lacking.  That same afternoon, Owen’s counsel filed a motion 
challenging federal subject-matter jurisdiction.7  The lower 
 
  * Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law.  Many 
thanks to the participants of the Inland Northwest Scholars Workshop and to 
my diligent research assistant, J.B. Evans. 
1. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367 (1978).  For 
a thorough discussion of this case by another Berch, my wonderful father, 
please see Michael A. Berch, The Erection of a Barrier Against Assertion of 
Ancillary Claims: An Examination of Owen Equipment and Erection 
Company v. Kroger, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253 (1979). 
2. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 367–68. 
3. Id. at 367–69 (citation omitted). 
4. Id. at 369. 
5. Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 
1977), rev’d sub nom. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377. 
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courts denied the motion, pointing out the gamesmanship by 
Owen, but the United States Supreme Court ultimately 
reversed.8  In doing so, the Supreme Court recited the black-
letter law pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction defects: “[i]t 
is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction.  The limits upon federal jurisdiction, 
whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be 
neither disregarded nor evaded.”9 
And, with that, the Supreme Court rewarded Owen for 
filing an incomplete and possibly intentionally misleading 
answer, delaying filing a dispositive motion to dismiss, waiting 
to see how the case would unfold at trial, wasting court time 
and party resources, and finally, belatedly raising the defect 
only after the applicable statute of limitations had expired, 
thus potentially preventing Mrs. Kroger from refiling her 
lawsuit in state court.10 
This Article explains why courts treat subject-matter 
jurisdiction as sacrosanct, demonstrates why this reaction is 
unwarranted, and advocates that, in cases like Kroger, a defect 
in the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction should be 
deemed waived if not raised before trial begins or any 
adjudication is made on the merits.11 
This Article addresses timely issues.  On May 26, 2015, the 
United States Supreme Court paved the way for a revised view 
 
8. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 369, 377. 
9. Id. at 374. 
10. Although we do not know for sure that Owen was purposely 
deceptive in its answer or in the timing of the motion to dismiss, many 
believe that is the case.  See Igor Potym, Federal Jurisdiction—Ancillary 
Jurisdiction—Independent Grounds of Jurisdiction Required for Plaintiff’s 
Claim Against Third Party Defendant (Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. 
Kroger), 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978), 62 MARQ. L. REV. 89, 99 (1978) (“Owen 
concealed its true citizenship until after the Iowa statute of limitations had 
expired.”). 
11. Cf. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 42(f)(1)(D) (describing when waiver occurs for the 
right to notice a judge; waiver occurs after “(aa) the judge rules on any 
contested issue; or (bb) the judge grants or denies a motion to dispose of one 
or more claims or defenses in the action; or (cc) the judge holds a scheduled 
conference or contested hearing; or (dd) trial commences”).  Merely holding a 
scheduled conference or the contested hearing should not trigger waiver of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court.  The other events, however, 
should trigger such waiver. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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of constitutional jurisdiction.12  In Wellness International 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, the Court held that parties’ consent 
cures a court’s constitutional jurisdictional deficiency.13  In this 
seemingly innocuous bankruptcy case—lost amid the 
blockbuster same-sex marriage,14 Affordable Care Act,15 and 
workplace discrimination16 cases of the 2014 Term—the 
Supreme Court quietly swept away formal jurisdictional 
categories and embraced practical solutions to jurisdictional 
defects.17 
Before taking up the Supreme Court’s charge and 
launching a full frontal attack on the doctrine, this Article first 
briefly reviews some fundamentals.  Subject-matter jurisdiction 
is the court’s power to adjudicate a case.18  Because subject-
matter jurisdiction restricts a court’s authority to hear a case 
and render a decision, courts say that they must treat it 
differently from other defects in a court proceeding; that is, 
they must treat it as “inflexible and without exception.”19  As 
part of this inflexibility, courts typically determine whether 
they have subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset of the 
litigation.20  But because jurisdiction is so important, defects in 
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time before 
the trial court and throughout the appeals process, even if the 
 
12. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
13. Id. at 1939. 
14. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
15. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
16. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015); 
Young v. UPS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
17. See Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1944.  Perhaps Wellness 
International will be like Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Erie, 
too, originally “went unnoticed until Justice Stone wrote privately to Arthur 
Krock of the New York Times, calling to his attention ‘the most important 
opinion since I have been on the court.’”  STEPHEN YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
243 (Aspen 8th ed. 2012) (citation omitted). 
18. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citation omitted). 
19. Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); see 
also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 
630 (2002)) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power 
to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.”). 
20. Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 667 F.2d 1151, 1154 (4th Cir. 
1982) (“[J]urisdiction is typically determined at the outset of litigation from 
the plaintiff’s complaint.”). 
3
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issue was not raised at the trial-court level.21  Judges may get 
in on the action and raise the issue themselves, even if no party 
has pointed out a potential defect.22  As a result of these late-
raised attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction, some judgments 
are reversed after lengthy trials and even after appeals have 
begun or have reached the Supreme Court.23  It is this 
understanding of the doctrine that led the Supreme Court to 
find that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction in Mrs. Kroger’s 
case.24 
Despite that seemingly iron-clad rhetoric, federal courts 
are not always so quick to dismiss cases with suspect 
jurisdiction.  At times, particularly to ameliorate the sting of 
belated attacks on jurisdiction, federal courts have created 
 
21. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (citations omitted) (“The objection that a 
federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by 
a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and 
the entry of judgment.”).  The treatises agree.  See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (“The parties cannot confer on a federal court 
jurisdiction that has not been vested in that court by the Constitution and 
Congress. This means that the parties cannot waive lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction by express consent, or by conduct, or even by estoppel. The 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is too fundamental a concern 
to be left to the whims and tactical concerns of the litigants. . . . Even if the 
parties remain silent, a federal court, whether trial or appellate, is obliged to 
notice on its own motion its lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or the lower 
court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction when a case is on appeal.”); 2 JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[1] (Matthew Bender 
& Co., Inc. 3d ed. 1997) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time.  Indeed, even if the litigants do not identify a potential problem in 
that respect, it is the duty of the court—at any level of the proceedings—to 
address the issue sua sponte whenever it is perceived.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (“The requirement of 
subject matter jurisdiction stands on different footing [from personal 
jurisdiction and notice requirements].  Broadly speaking, an objection to 
subject matter jurisdiction may be taken at any time during an action, even 
on appeal, and may be taken after the action has become final under a wider 
variety of circumstances than the objection to territorial jurisdiction.”). 
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the [district] court determines at any time 
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).  
If federal courts do change the timeframe for waiver, they will also need to 
spearhead a change to this rule.  See also supra note 21. 
23. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Belleri v. 
United States, 712 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 2013); Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., 669 
F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2012). 
24. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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exceptions to the allegedly inflexible doctrine.25 
The only readily admitted exception to the treatment of 
subject-matter jurisdiction as mandatory, inflexible, and 
nonwaivable is that subject-matter jurisdiction may not be 
raised on collateral attack;26 a judgment that has been upheld 
on appeal, or for which appeals or appeal periods have expired, 
becomes final and must generally be allowed to stand.27  But, 
despite the lack of popular acknowledgement, courts have 
created other exceptions to the uniform treatment of subject-
matter jurisdiction defects.28 
In earlier scholarship, I addressed these other exceptions, 
which include the following: federal courts may decide other 
jurisdictional issues, such as personal jurisdiction and forum 
non conveniens, before determining whether they have subject-
matter jurisdiction; federal “courts may issue, and need not 
unwind, non-dispositive orders even if the courts ultimately 
determine that they lack” the power to issue such orders; 
federal courts have the discretion to consider claims over which 
they have no subject-matter jurisdiction, “even if they have 
dismissed all the claims over which they did have subject-
matter jurisdiction[;]” and, at least in removal cases, parties 
may cure statutory subject-matter jurisdiction defects that 
have persisted throughout the case and should have nullified 
federal-court authority to adjudicate.29 
To complicate matters further, courts do not consistently 
follow the no-waiver rule or apply the exceptions.30  The result 
 
25. See infra Section I.A.2. 
26. See infra Section I.A.2.a. 
27. The no-waiver rhetoric suggests that parties should be permitted to 
raise the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on collateral attack.  The general 
rule, however, is that subject-matter jurisdiction may not be collaterally 
attacked.  See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 n.9 (2004) (citations 
omitted) (“Even subject-matter jurisdiction, however, may not be attacked 
collaterally.”).  But see Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) 
(permitting collateral attack because of the unique statutory scheme). 
28. See infra Section I.A.2.b–c (discussing other exceptions to the no-
waiver rule). 
29. Jessica Berch, Waving Goodbye to Non-Waivability: The Case for 
Permitting Waiver of Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Defects, 45 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 635, 669, 685, 692 (2014). 
30. By way of example, compare Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 
64 (1996) (permitting an exception to the no-waiver rule), with Grupo 
5
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is a haphazard landscape that produces inconsistencies in our 
system.31  Without the exceptions, the existence of a late-
discovered defect in subject-matter jurisdiction may prove 
harsh for the parties as the federal court dismisses the case, 
and may also prove costly to the courts as the case ends in one 
system and potentially begins anew in another; however, with 
the possibility of exceptions, the state of affairs may be even 
worse.  The ad hoc exceptions “fail to provide guidance for 
future cases, facially conflict with the rules governing subject-
matter jurisdiction, and add” to the uncertainty, costs, and 
delay of litigation.32 
These many exceptions to subject-matter jurisdiction show 
that the rhetoric espousing absolute rules is outdated, and 
worse, no longer aligns with practice.  In practice, courts often 
treat subject-matter jurisdiction more like other trial defects; 
namely, as waivable and even subordinate to other issues.  
Finding support in the actual treatment of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, rather than from the rhetoric surrounding the 
doctrine, I have previously argued that defects in a district 
court’s statutory subject-matter jurisdiction should be deemed 
waived if not timely raised.33  In the case of statutory subject-
matter jurisdiction, “timely” should not be read, as it is widely 
read today, to include direct appeals.  Drawing on work from 
the 1969 American Law Institute’s (“ALI”) Study on the 
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, I 
have advocated that statutory subject-matter jurisdiction 
should be deemed waived if not raised by the time trial begins 
or there is a dispositive ruling on any significant merits issue.34 
But my earlier scholarship did not address constitutional 
subject-matter jurisdiction.35  It seemed straightforward 
enough to make the argument that statutory subject-matter 
 
Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (declining to 
permit an exception to the no-waiver rule). 
31. See generally Berch, supra note 29, at 640–42. 
32. Id. at 640. 
33. Id. at 642–43. 
34. Id. at 642–43, 678–81. 
35. See id. at 680.  At the time I wrote that Article, Wellness 
International Network Ltd. v. Sharif had not been decided, and the case for 
permitting waiver of constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction defects was, 
accordingly, much weaker. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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jurisdiction could be subject to waiver.  After all, Congress 
surely has the power to change by statute the consequences of 
a late-raised statutory defect.  And federal courts are inclined 
to allow waiver even now, when the rhetoric allegedly prohibits 
such practice.  In any event, jurisdiction’s strong rhetoric of 
“inflexibility” and “without exception,” grounded in 
constitutional norms, did not seem to apply to statutory 
subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Now, prodded by the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement 
in Wellness International of a more flexible constitutional 
jurisdictional doctrine,36 I take the next step and argue that 
defects in a district court’s constitutional subject-matter 
jurisdiction, just like defects in its statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction, should be deemed waived if not raised by the 
commencement of trial or by any disposition on the merits, and 
the ALI’s proposal should be expanded to cover constitutional 
defects in a district court’s original jurisdiction, in addition to 
statutory defects.37  This waiver principle should apply only in 
district courts, not in cases originally filed in the Supreme 
Court or cases that have original jurisdiction in the district 
courts, but may be lacking appellate jurisdiction in a particular 
circuit court.38 
 
36. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015). 
37. Clearly, Congress may enact a statute detailing the consequences of 
a late-raised statutory subject-matter jurisdiction defect.  What about a 
constitutional defect?  The Constitution itself says nothing about when a 
federal court must determine its jurisdiction.  Nor does it decree that 
constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction defects cannot be waived.  Indeed, 
in the 1800s, the practice was to the contrary—and parties themselves could 
confer federal jurisdiction merely by pleading it.  See Berch, supra note 29, at 
685–88.  Given that waiver issues themselves are not mentioned in the text of 
the Constitution, but result simply from court practice, Congress may be able 
to enact this statute.  Alternatively, and likely preferably, the Supreme Court 
may alter constitutional practice.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes 
suggested that it has more leeway in changing constitutional precedent 
because Congress cannot correct the Court’s constitutional decisions.  See, 
e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–10 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
38. Regarding original jurisdiction, consider this hypothetical based on 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  Assume that Secretary of State 
Madison had appeared before the Supreme Court and did not raise lack of 
jurisdiction.  If the Supreme Court had sent the case to a Special Master for 
determination of the facts, all the while not suspecting a lack of jurisdiction, 
the Court should be able, at a later time, to dismiss the case for lack of 
7
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One brief caveat regarding waiver: one could say, at the 
extreme, that this thesis would allow federal courts to declare 
their own jurisdiction—to arrogate unto themselves the power 
to hear all cases, even in direct contravention of the words of 
the Constitution, or, perhaps worse, that it would allow parties 
to confer jurisdiction on federal courts.  But permitting waiver 
of late-discovered defects is not as radical as it may first 
appear.  Historically, the United States Supreme Court treated 
waiver of subject-matter jurisdiction very differently than it 
does today.39  Until the late 1800s, parties waived objections to 
jurisdiction “if the objection was not made by a pre-answer 
plea.”40  In the late 1800s, the pendulum began swinging 
toward nonwaivability.41  By the early 1900s, the change was 
complete, and courts had started cloaking subject-matter 
jurisdiction with the strict no-waiver mantra that survives to 
this day.42  The Aristotelian Mean suggests that a middle 
ground is preferable, and this proposal helps bring our 
understanding of subject-matter jurisdiction back to that more 
stable middle ground.  Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the 
courts at the pleading stage; but nor should parties be able to 
withhold a jurisdictional defense until late stages of the 
proceedings, including appeals.  Under this new proposal, 
courts and parties should, as they have always done, strive to 
act in conformity with the Constitution.  Parties should bring 
cases in federal court, and federal courts should hear those 
cases, only where the cases plausibly present federal 
jurisdiction.  But in those instances where the system fails—
where the parties did not timely object, the court did not notice, 
 
jurisdiction.  After all, there would have been no trial or other disposition on 
the merits.  Regarding appellate jurisdiction, consider a case properly heard 
in district court, but incorrectly appealed to a numbered circuit court, rather 
than the Federal Circuit.  That circuit court should be able to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction (lack of appellate jurisdiction), even though the case had 
progressed beyond trial.  For the remainder of this Article, when discussing 
the waiver principle, I mean waiver of the district court’s original 
jurisdiction. 
39. See Berch, supra note 29, at 685–88. 
40. Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1829, 1832 (2007). 
41. Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 381 (1884) 
(allowing subject-matter jurisdiction defect to be raised after trial). 
42. Berch, supra note 29, at 687. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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and trial has begun—the case should now proceed to judgment. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I briefly reviews 
why the current system of strong rhetoric, riddled with myriad 
exceptions, is cumbersome, confusing, and unnecessary.  Part 
II examines other structural constitutional doctrines that 
courts have nonetheless deemed waivable: mootness, sovereign 
immunity, and territorial conceptions of personal jurisdiction.43  
In Part III, the Article explores why these other doctrines 
provide justifications for the waivability of constitutional 
subject-matter jurisdiction.44  Finally, Part IV demonstrates 
how this new proposal could extend beyond jurisdiction to other 
justiciability doctrines and statutory prerequisites to suit. 
 
I. The Current System is Unworkable 
 
Subject-matter jurisdiction’s paramount importance and 
resulting alleged inflexibility stems from its basis in the 
Constitution.45  A federal court cannot overlook a constitutional 
requirement, particularly a constitutional requirement limiting 
the court’s power over the very matter at issue.46  Nor may a 
party simply sidestep constitutional requirements by 
inattention or scheme to do so by guile.47  The Constitution 
stands as the irreducible minimum with which courts, parties, 
and attorneys must comply.  For these reasons, subject-matter 
jurisdiction must be present in every federal-court action; and, 
according to today’s doctrine (at least before Wellness 
 
43. The criminal law right to a fair trial may also partake of these 
attributes.  However, criminal law implications are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
44. I do not claim perfect alignment, merely useful comparisons; so, in 
Part III, I also acknowledge weaknesses in the analogies between these 
doctrines and subject-matter jurisdiction. 
45. See, e.g., 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1350 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that subject-matter jurisdiction involves the 
courts’ power to hear cases and comes from Article III of the Constitution). 
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1982) (“[A] court is powerless to decide a controversy with respect to which it 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
47. Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., 362 F.3d 136, 
139 (1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“Just as a federal court cannot expand 
its jurisdictional horizon, parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on 
a federal court ‘by indolence, oversight, acquiescence, or consent.’”). 
9
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International), if a party or the court discovers a potential 
defect at any time, even on appeal, the defect may be raised 
and may serve as a reason to undo any judgment and dismiss 
the action.48 
That is the allegedly smooth landscape covering subject-
matter jurisdiction.  On closer viewing, however, the landscape 
has ditches, crags, streams, hills, and rocky terrain as well.  
Courts do permit subject-matter jurisdiction defects to be 
waived, deferred, or pretermitted in favor of other, easier 
issues and resolutions.49  This section of the Article briefly 
reviews both the inflexible rhetoric and its exceptions.50 
 
A. Why the Current System in Unworkable 
 
1. Inflexible Rhetoric 
 
Sometimes, as in Kroger, federal courts follow the 
inflexible rhetoric of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss 
cases—even mature cases near resolution.  Probably the most 
famous (or infamous) example of dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction occurred in Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
Co. v. Mottley.51  The Mottleys had received free train passes 
from the Louisville & Nashville Railroad.  When the Railroad 
ceased to honor the passes, citing a federal statute purportedly 
disallowing such free passes, the Mottleys sued for breach of 
contract.52  The case was a state-law breach of contract matter, 
but all the contested issues involved federal law; namely, the 
interpretation and constitutionality of the federal statute on 
which the Railroad had relied in its defense.53  After the lower 
 
48. Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. 
REV. 49, 49 (1962) (“In the name of this saintly precept a plaintiff may choose 
his forum, lose his suit and try again in another forum on the ground that the 
first court had no jurisdiction.”). 
49. See Berch, supra note 29, at 662–75. 
50. For a more in-depth exploration of this topic, see Berch, supra note 
29, at 675–92.  If you have read that piece, or are otherwise familiar with 
subject-matter jurisdiction’s practice-rhetoric gap, you may jump to Part I.B, 
infra. 
51. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
52. Id. at 150–51. 
53. Id. at 151–52. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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federal court ruled on the merits in the Mottleys’ favor, the 
United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction because neither the federal 
statutory nor the constitutional issues arose on the face of the 
Mottleys’ well-pleaded complaint.54 
Other cases of late-raised defects followed by dismissal 
grace the pages of the reporters with little fanfare, such as 
Belleri v. United States,55 Builders Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Dragas Management,56 and Arena v. Graybar.57  These circuit 
cases proceeded to judgment in district court before the issue of 
subject-matter jurisdiction was raised for the first time.  These 
are just a few examples.  One article reports that 
approximately five-hundred cases fall to late-raised defects 
 
54. Id. at 152. 
55. Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 2013).  In Belleri, a 
plaintiff sued the United States and federal officials.  Id. at 545–46.  At first, 
all of the parties agreed that the plaintiff, as a citizen of the United States, 
could maintain the action.  Id.  On appeal, however, the defendants, for the 
first time, alleged that the plaintiff was, instead, an alien.  Id. at 547.  Aliens 
cannot institute actions under the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.  Id. at 544.  The Eleventh Circuit 
remanded the case to the district court for purposes of determining subject-
matter jurisdiction.  Id. 
56. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt. Corp., No. 11-1722, 2012 WL 
5861255, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2012).  In Builders Mutual Insurance Co., 
Builders filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured, seeking a 
judgment that it owed no duty to indemnify.  Builders named a second 
insurer, Fireman’s Insurance Company, as a defendant.  On appeal, the 
insured argued, for the first time, that Fireman’s should be realigned as a 
plaintiff and that such realignment would destroy complete diversity.  The 
Fourth Circuit agreed with both arguments and ordered the case to be 
dismissed.   Id. at **1–2, 4. 
57. Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 669 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2012).  
In Arena, the plaintiff sued the defendants for violations of a federal statute 
and supplemental state-law claims.  The case proceeded to trial.  At the 
beginning of trial, the district court dismissed the federal claim, but decided 
to keep the state-law claims.  At the end of the bench trial, the court entered 
judgment for the plaintiff.  Only after judgment did the defendants request 
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, alleging that there had never 
been jurisdiction over the federal claim and that, therefore, the district court 
could not have retained jurisdiction over the state-law claims.  The district 
court disagreed; but, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the alleged federal 
claim had been “fatally defective” on its face and, therefore, the district court 
never had jurisdiction over the case.  In other words, never having had 
jurisdiction in the first instance, the district court could not have exercised 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.  Seven years after the 
start of litigation, the case was dismissed.  Id. at 217–18, 221, 225. 
11
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each year.58 
As if this inflexibility were not bad enough for the 
efficiency of our civil justice system, the inflexibility sometimes 
yields to exceptions.  The overlay of these ad hoc exceptions 
makes it hard to predict whether the rule or an exception will 
apply in any particular case.  This leads to inconsistent 
applications of the subject-matter jurisdiction doctrine and 
leaves parties and attorneys guessing as to which way the 
court will rule on their particular subject-matter jurisdiction 
squabble. 
 
2. Ad-Hoc Exceptions 
 
 a. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction May Not Be Raised On 
Collateral Attack59 
 
The most well-known exception to the rule that subject-
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time is that the defect 
may not generally be reviewed on collateral attack.60  This is 
true whether a party (or the court) raised the defect in the 
original proceeding or not.61  Some courts and treatises take 
this exception a step further and advocate that even a 
defendant who defaults may not raise subject-matter 
jurisdiction on collateral attack, under the theory that the 
court, at least, was policing this issue just as the defendant 
would have had he appeared in the original action.62 
 
58. Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 653, 655 (2014). 
59. Collateral attacks are attacks on judgments other than by way of 
direct appeal.  Collateral Attack, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
61. Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial 
Decisionmaking:  Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit 
Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 313 (2011) (“[A] judgment resting on assumed 
subject-matter jurisdiction can nonetheless stand safe from challenge.  
Notwithstanding all the slogans about subject-matter jurisdiction’s 
fundamental importance, the offense to the systemic interests at stake is not 
great enough always to warrant relief from judgment . . . .”). 
62. 13D WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3536 (3d 
ed. 2015) (“Thus, it seems appropriate to assume that the court entering the 
default judgment did make a determination that it had subject matter 
jurisdiction.  After all, the court had no business entering a judgment unless 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction defects cannot be 
collaterally attacked is a rule about waiver.  A defect that 
remains unnoticed through the original proceedings has been 
waived, despite the no-waiver rhetoric. 
 
 b. Courts May Rule on Other Matters Before Addressing 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
At least one other exception to subject-matter jurisdiction’s 
lofty status is also well-known, if not popularly acknowledged 
as an exception: courts may rule on other matters before 
determining whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the case.63  These rulings remain in effect even if the court 
later determines it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and 
therefore lacked the power to issue the prior rulings.64  This 
exception shows that subject-matter jurisdiction defects may be 
ignored—at least for a time—in favor of other matters, even if 
those matters prove dispositive of the action. 
One prominent example of this phenomenon is that federal 
courts may rule on personal jurisdiction defects before 
addressing subject-matter jurisdiction defects.65  The Supreme 
Court has unanimously sanctioned the practice, if only when 
the alleged subject-matter jurisdiction defect presents thorny 
 
it had already determined that the case was properly before it.”).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (permitting 
collateral attack of a default judgment). 
63. See Berch, supra note 29, at 666–72; see also Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435 (2007) (permitting district 
courts to decide forum non conveniens motions before subject-matter 
jurisdiction issues); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 
(1999) (granting district courts the flexibility to decide easy personal 
jurisdiction issues before complicated subject-matter jurisdiction issues);  In 
re LimitNone LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576–78 (7th Cir. 2008) (deciding venue 
before subject-matter jurisdiction).  Other interim orders may also be issued.  
13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 3522 (“Despite the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, a federal court may be justified in ordering payment of 
just costs upon dismissal, assessing attorney’s fees or costs for improperly 
removed cases, imposing sanctions under Civil Rule 11 if it finds an abuse of 
the judicial process, imposing sanctions for improper conduct related to 
discovery under Civil Rule 37, or ordering other appropriate relief concerning 
inappropriate behavior.”). 
64. E.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135–36 (1992). 
65. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587. 
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issues while the personal jurisdiction issue presents a 
straightforward inquiry with a clear resolution.66 
From that fairly humble starting point, federal courts have 
greatly expanded their power to rule on other procedural issues 
before determining whether they have subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Federal courts have dismissed actions under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine without first determining 
whether they have subject-matter jurisdiction.67  Federal 
courts have also taken the liberty of deciding venue issues 
before confirming their subject-matter jurisdiction.68  The 
United States Supreme Court has even found it appropriate to 
decide class certification issues before subject-matter 
jurisdiction.69  In all of these examples, from personal 
jurisdiction to class certification, the federal courts are making 
a pragmatic choice: it is more expedient to decide these other 
issues, some of which may resolve the action, before trying to 
resolve a more complex question of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Relatedly, federal courts may issue a variety of other 
orders even though they may ultimately lack subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the action.  Federal courts may permit parties 
to conduct discovery, and the courts may continue “to issue 
sanctions, to hold a trial, and to assess costs . . . .”70  In this 
vein, federal courts can, and do, hold trial in removal cases in 
which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction.  The resulting 
judgment in such a case is valid as long as the parties cure the 
defect by the time the court enters judgment.71 
With respect to the other sorts of interim orders—the ones 
that appear non-dispositive—the court may leave them in 
place, even if the court later discovers it lacks power over the 
action.72  Some of these orders, such as important discovery 
 
66. Id. at 588. 
67. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 435. 
68. In re LimitNone, 551 F.3d at 576–78. 
69. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999); see also Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997). 
70. Mary Elizabeth Phelan, May a Federal District Court Dismiss a 
Removed Case for Want of Personal Jurisdiction Before Deciding Whether it 
Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction?, 6 PREVIEW  U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 315, 318 
(1999). 
71. Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76–77 (1996). 
72. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135–36 (1992); see also United 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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rulings or preliminary injunctions, so vastly change the parties’ 
leverage that they may have already settled, or settled on very 
different terms than otherwise would have seemed fair.73  In 
other words, these orders, even when issued by courts lacking 
subject-matter jurisdiction, can effectively alter the parties’ 
actions and end the action.  This is another stark exception to 
subject-matter jurisdiction’s alleged necessity and supremacy. 
 
 c. Federal Courts May Retain Non-Diverse, State-Based 
Claims 
 
As a third example, federal courts may also decide entirely 
state-law issues between non-diverse parties, even after all 
federal claims have been dismissed.  The supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,74 provides trial courts 
wide discretion to keep or dismiss such actions.75  Before the 
enactment of that statute, the common-law doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction permitted similar flexibility.76 
Although it rarely occurs, district courts sometimes do 
exercise their discretion to retain such state-based claims and 
are most apt to do so when the courts consider it “efficient.”77  
In Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, for example, 
the federal claim was dismissed only nine days before trial.78  
The district court kept the related state claims, and the Second 
Circuit affirmed that decision.79 
In retaining these entirely state-based causes of action, 
 
States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
73. Clermont, supra note 61, at 304. 
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (codifying the common-law doctrines of 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). 
75. Id. at § 1367(c) (enumerating discretionary factors). 
76. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727–28 (1966). 
77. See, e.g., Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 
1187 (2d Cir. 1996); Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d 
Cir. 1990). 
78. Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1192; see also Raucci, 902 F.2d at 1054 (“The 
district court granted defendants summary judgment only on the section 
1983 claims.  The court retained jurisdiction over the pendent state 
negligence claims because at the time of the dismissal discovery was 
completed and dispositive motions had been decided in this case, which was 
ready for trial.”). 
79. Nowak, 81 F.3d at 1192. 
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these federal courts reach beyond their core jurisdictional 
purview, often because they deem it more efficient to retain 
jurisdiction over the claims to which the courts have already 
been exposed and in which they, and the parties, have invested 
significant time, energy, and resources. 
 
*  *  * 
 
In sum, although we say that subject-matter jurisdiction is 
required before federal courts may exercise their power over 
the case, that jurisdiction must be determined at the outset of 
the litigation, and that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived or passed over to decide other issues, the truth of the 
matter is that federal courts have some leeway in how and 
when to address the issue.  The federal courts deploy 
exceptions when it seems “fair” or “efficient” to do so.  The ad 
hoc nature of the current landscape makes it difficult for 
parties and attorneys to predict when the courts will keep a 
case or dismiss it and, therefore, difficult for courts and 
academicians to justify.  If subject-matter jurisdiction can be 
waived (on collateral attack), excused (in favor of dismissal on 
another ground), deferred (in favor of an interim ruling), or 
expanded (to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims), then 
perhaps federal courts should simply abrogate the rigid 
rhetoric and forthrightly acknowledge that subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects can already be waived and deferred. 
Our current system thus presents two layers of problems.  
First, the various exceptions conflict with the rhetoric.  Second, 
even with the escape hatches, approximately 500 cases are 
belatedly dismissed on jurisdictional grounds each year.80  This 
system neither possesses the coherency of the rhetoric nor the 




B.  Other Responses to the Problem 
 
This lamentable state of affairs is becoming more and more 
 
80. Buehler, supra note 58, at 655. 
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evident and awkward.  In the past decade, a flurry of scholarly 
activity has centered on the inconsistent manner in which our 
federal civil justice system handles subject-matter jurisdiction 
defects.  Scholars have variously described the problem and 
offered differing solutions.81  Some of these descriptions and 
solutions center on re-defining subject-matter jurisdiction to 
encompass a smaller universe, so fewer cases fall to delayed 
attacks;82 others focus on blurring the line between subject-
matter jurisdiction defects and other defects because of the 
particularly harsh results of calling a defect a “subject-matter” 
defect;83 some advocate waiving statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects early in the litigation;84 and yet another 
group calls for jurisdictional resequencing to alleviate the 
pressure that delayed subject-matter jurisdiction attacks can 
cause.85  Professor Dustin E. Buehler has a particularly 
provocative proposal: “[f]ederal courts should adjudicate and 
resolve all subject-matter jurisdiction questions at the outset of 
litigation.  The rules should require district courts to 
affirmatively certify the existence of jurisdiction in every case; 
after that point, objections to statutory federal jurisdiction 
would be waived.”86  All of these proposals seek to cure the 
ultimate defect—the inconsistency of the courts’ treatment of 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
81. E.g., id. at 689 (proposing that federal courts be required to 
affirmatively certify the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset 
of litigation); Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439 
(2011) (discussing nonjurisdictional attributes of jurisdictional rules); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 353, 365–67 (2010) (attempting to resolve the dichotomy between the 
liberal ethos of access to the courts and resolution on the merits with the 
restrictive nature of federal subject-matter jurisdiction); Steven Vladeck, The 
Problem of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. 587, 603–04 
(2009) (questioning the precedential force of cases in which subject-matter 
jurisdiction is later found lacking). 
82. See Berch, supra note 29, at 645–51. 
83. Dodson, supra note 81, at 1454 (“[J]urisdictionality is more 
malleable than [the traditional view] presupposes.”). 
84. Qian A. Gao, Note, “Salvage Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable to 
the Wrecking Ball”:  Barring Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2369 (2005); see generally Berch, supra note 29. 
85. Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 
1122 (2013). 
86. Buehler, supra note 58, at 657–58. 
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The United States Supreme Court, too, has considered 
changing how our system handles late-raised subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects.87  In the past few terms, the Court has 
taken extra care to label issues as nonjurisdictional, in part 
because of the harsh results that flow from the jurisdictional 
label.88  As a consequence the Court has changed course and, 
while it once freely labeled issues as subject-matter jurisdiction 
and therefore nonwaivable, it is now more likely to call similar 
issues merits-based (that is, nonjurisdictional) and waivable.89  
The Court has admitted it regrets its previous handling of the 
issue and has asked the federal courts to take greater care in 
their jurisdictional labeling.90 
For example, in its 2009 term, the Court decided four cases 
 
87. For example, in the 2009 term, the Supreme Court decided four 
cases that turned on whether a certain issue was jurisdictional.  In each case, 
the Supreme Court called the issue nonjurisdictional.  See generally Morrison 
v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010) (deciding that 
whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of 
action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for 
misconduct regarding foreign securities is a merits inquiry, not a 
jurisdictional one); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 
273 (2010) (discussing whether an undue hardship finding in an adversary 
proceeding is a jurisdictional requirement); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (holding that the Copyright Act’s registration 
requirement is not a restriction on subject-matter jurisdiction); Union Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 82–86 (2009) (concluding that the requirement that 
parties in minor disputes must attempt settlement is not a limitation on the 
National Railroad Adjustment Board’s jurisdiction).  In the 2014 term, the 
Supreme Court held that the time limitations in the Federal Tort Claims Act 
are not jurisdictional.  United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 
1629 (2015). 
88. See generally Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006) 
(holding that a fifteen-person requirement in Title VII was a merits issue, not 
a jurisdictional one). 
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
90. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (“To ward off profligate use of the 
term ‘jurisdiction,’ we have adopted a ‘readily administrable bright line’ for 
determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional.  We 
inquire whether Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional; 
absent such a clear statement, we have cautioned, ‘courts should treat the 
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.’”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91–92 (1998) (warning against “drive-by” 
jurisdictional rulings); see also Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Schs., 715 F.3d 
775, 783 (10th Cir. 2013). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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that addressed whether certain statutory requirements were 
jurisdictional or merits-based.91  In all four cases, the Court 
deemed the requirements nonjurisdictional, thereby escaping 
both the harsh consequences of labeling the issues “subject-
matter jurisdiction” and the subsequent necessity of deciding 
whether or not to deploy an exception.92  In all four cases, the 
Court deemed the merits issue waived and allowed the case to 
proceed.93 
Scholarship in the area shows how our system could 
plausibly handle core subject-matter jurisdiction defects (those 
that even the Supreme Court would, today, label jurisdictional) 
and offers interesting suggestions for changing the 
conceptualization of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules.  
In addition, the Supreme Court’s careful delineation between 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional is a laudable step toward 
alleviating some of the current problems our system 
experiences in managing late-raised subject-matter jurisdiction 
defects.  If subject-matter jurisdiction is narrowly defined, as 
the Supreme Court says it should be, fewer issues will fall 
within its purview, and fewer late-raised defects will be 
deemed to undermine the federal courts’ power, thereby 
triggering the harsh consequences of subject-matter 
jurisdiction’s no-waiver rule or necessitating the court to rely 
on a sense of “fairness” to maneuver around subject-matter 
jurisdiction’s no-waiver rule. 
This Article agrees with much of the groundwork laid by 
the Justices and by other legal scholars and builds on it.  
Lawyers’ and courts’ profligate use of the term “subject-matter 
jurisdiction” creates problems and leads courts to employ the 
jurisdictional “raise anytime” rule too readily.  The attempted 
rigid delineation of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules 
also poses problems and leads courts—including the United 
States Supreme Court—to worry so much about the 
consequences of jurisdictional labeling that they waste judicial 
energy trying to ascertain into which doctrinal box an issue 
fits.  Even then, their work is not complete, for they must 
 
91. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254; United Student, 559 U.S. at 273; Reed, 
559 U.S. at 157; Union Pac., 558 U.S. at 82–86. 
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determine whether to apply the general rule to the situation, or 
an exception.  This Article, however, goes further to alleviate 
these problems in our civil justice system.94 
 
C.  The Time is Right to Change our Approach 
 
Despite the many solutions that have been offered up in 
the hopes of untangling subject-matter jurisdiction’s tangled 
web, none seems to have gained traction.95  Why another 
proposed solution?  The United States Supreme Court’s May 
2015 decision in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 
indicates that the Court may now be willing to view 
jurisdiction more flexibly.96  The case received little attention 
in newspapers or legal blogs, but it stirred vigorous debate 
among the Justices.  While the majority took a flexible 
approach to its jurisdictional analysis, the dissent warned that 
the Court would soon regret its cavalier attitude toward 
constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction defects.97 
Wellness International involved a bankruptcy; the case 
presented the question of whether Article III is violated when 
parties consent to the adjudication of non-core claims by a 
bankruptcy court.98  If the parties had not consented, an Article 
III court would have been the appropriate federal forum to 
hear their claims.99  In a departure from the long-held rule that 
parties may not confer jurisdiction by consent,100 a majority of 
 
94. Most notably, if the “raise anytime” rule does not apply to subject-
matter jurisdiction, then the primary reason for ascertaining whether a late-
raised defect relates to subject-matter ceases to exist.  Whether subject-
matter or merits, the issue has been waived. 
95. See supra Section I.B. 
96. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
97. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
impact of today’s decision may seem limited, but the Court’s acceptance of an 
Article III violation is not likely to go unnoticed.  The next time Congress 
takes judicial power from Article III courts, the encroachment may not be so 
modest—and we will no longer hold the high ground of principle.  The 
majority’s acquiescence in the erosion of our constitutional power sets a 
precedent that I fear we will regret.  I respectfully dissent.”). 
98. Id. at 1939. 
99. Id. (holding that “Article III is not violated when the parties 
knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy judge”). 
100. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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the United States Supreme Court concluded that parties’ 
consent cures an Article I court’s constitutional defect as long 
as the intrusion on Article III power is “de minimis.”101 
The majority knew it was entering delicate territory, and 
the Justices carefully distinguished the personal right inherent 
in Article III to an “impartial and independent federal 
adjudication of claims”102 from the structural right “of the 
constitutional system of checks and balances,”103 which assigns 
bankruptcy issues to Article I bankruptcy courts while 
reserving other issues for adjudication by Article III judges.104  
The majority reasoned that consent cures any personal defect, 
which explains why a “federal criminal defendant, for example, 
may knowingly and voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial by pleading guilty to a charged offense.”105  
And although the Court seemed to hesitate before concluding 
that consent also cures the structural defect, that is ultimately 
what the majority decided.106 
In the end, Wellness International permits a de minimis 
intrusion on the Article III power of the federal courts—
transferring that power from Article III judges to Article I 
judges because the parties consented to the transfer.107  
Wellness International does so by looking past formalistic 
categories.108  The Court embraced a practical solution to the 
problem of late-raised jurisdictional defects, suggesting that 
 
850–51 (1986). 
101. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1943. 
102. Id. (citations omitted).  Interestingly, in the criminal context, the 
right to a fair trial is a structural right. 
103. Id. (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850–51). In the context of a 
bankruptcy action, the structural right reserves the judicial power to Article 
III judges as opposed to Article I judges.  Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1950 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Outside of the bankruptcy context, the structural 
right reserves the judicial power to Article III judges as opposed to state-
court judges. 
104. Bankruptcy courts may hear “core proceedings” arising under the 
bankruptcy laws.  28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012). 
105. Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1950, 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
106. Id. at 1944. 
107. Id. (explaining that the infringement is de minimis because “Article 
III courts retain supervisory authority over the process”). 
108. Id. at 1944 n.9 (“[T]he principal dissent’s insistence on formalism 
leads it astray.”). 
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the Court may be open to doing so in the future as well.  The 
problem posed by late-raised defects can be solved “not by 
‘formalistic and unbending rules,’ but ‘with an eye to the 
practical effect that the’ practice ‘will have on the 
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.’”109  In 
other words, the Court permits some shuffling of constitutional 
power away from Article III courts, as long as the ebb does not 
recede too far.  In the bankruptcy context, the outflow of 
power—that is, ceding a bit of power by allowing Article I 
judges to decide some issues by consent of the parties—is not 
too great because bankruptcy judges “are appointed and subject 
to removal by Article III judges,” “serve as judicial officers of 
the United States district court,” and “collectively ‘constitute a 
unit of the district court.’”110  But aside from the caveats and 
the provisos, the message comes through clearly: parties may 
now consent to jurisdiction. 
The dissent makes some cogent points.  Wellness 
International has emanations far beyond the bankruptcy 
arena.  But, as dissents often do, the doomsday predictions 
overstate the effect. And, to the majority’s credit, Wellness 
International’s frank recognition of the messy state of 
jurisdictional analysis is just what was needed to help clear the 
way for a thoughtful re-evaluation of the absoluteness of 
jurisdictional rules.  Indeed, it paves the way for a cohesive 
theory of subject-matter jurisdiction that incorporates many of 
the ad hoc exceptions that have plagued the doctrine of subject-
matter jurisdiction.111 
The model proposed in this Article expands on the Wellness 
International framework.  But it offers the reverse scenario: 
rather than arguing for a de minimis diminution of Article III 
power, as the Court does in Wellness International, the Article 
proposes a de minimis accretion of that power. 
First, in the context of federal-versus-state subject-matter 
jurisdiction, just as in the Article-III-versus-bankruptcy 
scenario, there is both a personal and structural aspect.  The 
personal aspect concerns the parties’ preference for where the 
 
109. Id. at 1944. 
110. Id. (citations omitted). 
111. See supra Section I.A.2. 
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litigation takes place.  In many cases, plaintiffs may choose to 
file in federal or state court, defendants may seek to remove, 
and plaintiffs may have the option to remand.  Clearly, parties 
may consent to that personal aspect of jurisdiction (their 
preference on where to adjudicate the case) or waive the 
preference by not timely raising an objection.  The structural 
aspect relates to the balance of power between state and 
federal courts, with federal courts hearing only certain types of 
claims.  If Article III jurisdiction can be consented away from 
Article III courts, as Wellness International suggests, perhaps 
it can also be consented to Article III courts as well. 
Second, any structural intrusion will be de minimis.  After 
all, the solution advocated by this Article affects only cases 
with constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction defects that 
nobody—not the plaintiff, defendant, judge, or law clerk—
noticed before trial or other resolution on the merits.  Lawyers 
and courts will still be under ethical obligations to consider 
jurisdiction and not to hide deficiencies.  Despite the de 
minimis structural intrusion, the efficiency gains will be 
enormous for those several hundred cases each year that will 
be permitted to remain in federal court.112 
 
D.  Proposed Solution to the Problem 
 
Taking its cue from Wellness International, this Article 
proposes a single, uniform approach to the waiver of defects in 
district court subject-matter jurisdiction.  The approach is 
based on a proposition  advocated in 1969 by the American Law 
Institute (“ALI”), and for which I have provided support in 
previous scholarship,113 but goes further than the ALI (or I, at 
least initially) was willing to go. 
Previously, I have advocated that statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects can be waived.114  Indeed, federal courts 
 
112. Buehler, supra note 58, at 656. 
113. See generally Berch, supra note 29. 
114. Id.  Federal statutes heighten the requirements of the Constitution.  
With respect to federal question jurisdiction, for example, the Constitution 
requires a federal ingredient, while 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires a federal 
question on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.  See Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that “a suit 
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already subject late-raised defects to a de facto, albeit 
clandestine, waiver rule through the ad hoc exceptions.115  And 
the additional statutory requirements—grafted onto the 
constitutional requirements—are not part of the core power 
limitations.  Congress, which put those extra limitations on the 
federal courts, could easily remove them or, as my previous 
Article proposes, subject them to waiver.116 
However, as explored in detail in the remainder of this 
Article, there is no substantial reason why defects having their 
bases in the Constitution should not also be subject to an 
explicit waiver rule.  Wellness International surely goes 
partway in providing an analytical framework for that solution.  
The next section of the Article sweeps away the final debris.  
Ultimately, the solution to late-raised defects is simple and 
elegant: treat constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction 
requirements like statutory ones, and subject both to a waiver 
rule.  Courts should treat district court subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects—whether constitutional or statutory—as 
waived if not raised prior to trial or any disposition on the 
merits.117 
That time frame is neither too short nor too long.  It is long 
enough to provide time for a party or a court to notice the 
defect, yet short enough that parties and the court will not 
have invested too much time, money, and effort in the case 
before its dismissal from the federal system, should that 
ultimately need to occur.  Surely, the federal courts or the 
 
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the 
plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon 
those laws or that Constitution”); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 
823 (1824) (explaining “federal ingredient” test).  With respect to diversity 
jurisdiction, the Constitution requires minimal diversity and imposes no 
minimum amount in controversy, while 28 U.S.C. § 1332 adds a complete 
diversity requirement and a $75,000.01 floor.  Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 
267, 267 (1986) (requiring complete diversity); State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (endorsing minimal diversity in 
Article III).  Therefore, a case may fail a statutory requirement, but 
nonetheless fall within the Constitution’s ambit.  In that scenario, I posited 
that any late-raised objection to the purely statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction defect should be deemed waived. 
115. See supra Section I.A.2 (explaining ad hoc exceptions). 
116. See Berch, supra note 29, at 680–81. 
117. Alternatively, Congress may be able to enact a statute dictating 
these same results.  See supra note 37. 
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party that did not choose federal court will spot an egregious 
defect (such as a car accident between two California 
domiciliaries).  The only cases that might elude notice by the 
time of any merits disposition are those about which a serious 
ground for disagreement regarding federal jurisdiction exists—
for example, a case governed by the embedded federal question 
doctrine118 or one in which domicile is in flux, and the federal 
courts may arguably have jurisdiction over such cases in any 
event.  After all, the embedded federal question doctrine has 
inexact contours, and determining domicile is not a precise 
science. 
Jurisdiction matters.  But, as the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Wellness International, it is not sacrosanct 
and may be subject to exceptions such as consent.119  Moreover, 
many watchdogs protect jurisdiction and have incentives to 
point out jurisdictional defects.  Parties who do not wish to 
proceed in federal court have incentives to scrutinize 
jurisdictional issues to ensure that the case is properly in 
federal court.  Therefore, if a plaintiff brings a case in federal 
court and the defendant does not want to proceed there, the 
defendant has reason to double-check the Article III status of 
the matter.  Likewise, if a defendant removes a case to federal 
court, the plaintiff should review the case’s jurisdictional 
status. The federal judge presiding over the matter should 
verify the court’s power to hear the case as well.  These 
safeguards will cover the vast majority of cases.  But if a 
matter manages to make it to trial despite a jurisdictional 
defect that neither the parties nor the judge observed, the 
matter should proceed to judgment.  Otherwise, state-court 
judges will be required to re-read already read motions, re-
decide already decided issues, and even re-hear already heard 
 
118. For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a case arises under federal law in 
two ways.  First, a case arises under federal law when federal law creates the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 
U.S. 257, 260 (1916).  Second, a case may arise under federal law when the 
plaintiff’s complaint invokes a state-law claim, but that claim “necessarily 
raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a 
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”  Grable & 
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
119. See supra Section I.C. 
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testimony.  In today’s world of shrinking budgets, particularly 
shrinking state-court budgets, the federal judicial system 
should not foist more work on state courts.  Jurisdiction 
matters, but it does not matter more than the smooth, efficient, 
fair working of the judicial system. 
 
II. Other Structural and Constitutional Doctrines Are 
Waivable 
 
Wellness International is not the only example of a policy-
based or practical exception to jurisdictional imperatives.  
Other constitutional doctrines that serve to limit federal court 
power are also subject to waiver.  As will be explored in this 
section, mootness, state sovereign immunity, and the territorial 
conception of personal jurisdiction all find their roots in the 
Constitution and purport to limit court power, yet are, at least 




Federal court cases must be “live” throughout their 
pendency;120 a case must be “ripe”121 at its inception, and not 
become “overripe” before its conclusion.122  The mootness 
doctrine ensures that cases remain live.  Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly use the term “mootness,” the 
United States Supreme Court has found this requirement 
inherent in the “case or controversy” language of Article III, 
and thus constitutionally required.123  The Supreme Court has 
explained: “[o]ur lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases 
derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution 
under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the 
 
120. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (stating “a present, live 
controversy . . . must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract 
propositions of law”). 
121. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 58 (1993) (noting that 
a challenge to an agency regulation “would not be ripe before the regulation’s 
application to the plaintiffs in some more acute fashion”). 
122. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal 
Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1995) (explaining that mootness “may be a 
reflection” of ripeness, except that the case is “overripe, if anything”). 
123. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726–27 (2013). 
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existence of a case or controversy.”124  The federal courts 
implicitly recognize mootness’s constitutional status when they 
inquire into the issue for the first time on appeal.125 
The requirement that a case must remain live serves as a 
structural limitation on federal-court power.  Its location in 
Article III suggests as much; so does how it functions.  
Mootness limits the power of the courts so that they decide only 
live, adverse matters and keeps federal courts from issuing 
advisory opinions.126 
Despite the constitutional and structural stature of 
mootness, courts may, in some instances, continue to hear moot 
cases.  Federal courts recognize a handful of exceptions to 
mootness, each of which permits the case to remain in federal 
court despite its lack of continuing vitality between the current 
parties.  The three most frequently applied exceptions to 
mootness are: capable of repetition but evading review, 
voluntary cessation, and class actions.127  The exceptions are 
grounded in prudential norms like efficiency and sunk costs.128  
 
124. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). 
125. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317–23 (1988) (considering a 
mootness issue raised for the first time during oral argument); see also 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 (1997) (discussing 
mootness raised for the first time before the Ninth Circuit); 13B WRIGHT & 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.1 (3d ed. 2015) (footnotes 
omitted) (“In keeping with the Article III foundations of mootness doctrine, 
the question of mootness is often raised by the courts even though neither 
party has raised it, or when the party raising the question has suggested that 
the Court ignore it, or when both parties join in agreeing that the case is not 
moot.”). 
126. Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134 n.15 (1977) (“The availability 
of thoroughly prepared attorneys to argue both sides of a constitutional 
question, and of numerous amici curiae ready to assist in the decisional 
process, even though all of them ‘stand like greyhounds in the slips, straining 
upon the start,’ does not dispense with the requirement that there be a live 
dispute between ‘live’ parties before we decide such a question.”). 
127. Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 576 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he three most 
frequently-applied [sic] exceptions to mootness doctrine [are] those applying 
to (1) claims ‘capable of repetition yet evading review’—that is, claims that 
raise issues that are of inherently short duration, and are likely to recur; 
(2) cases mooted by the defendant’s voluntary cessation of the challenged 
activity; and (3) class actions in which the named plaintiff’s claim has become 
moot.”).  A fourth exception has to do with collateral consequences. 
128. Id. at 563–64 (footnotes omitted) (“The exceptions to mootness do 
not appear to be based on any interpretation of Article III’s Case or 
27
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They make eminent practical sense, but are hard to square 
with the inflexible constitutional requirement of a live case or 
controversy.129 
Take, for example, the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-
review cases.130  In those, the person who brought the case no 
longer has a continuing dispute with the defendant.131  
Nonetheless, the courts permit the admittedly defunct case to 
continue if the plaintiff’s claim is of a class of cases that may 
recur and whose injuries have a shorter lifespan than the 
duration of a typical lawsuit.132  This exception to mootness 
may apply even if the plaintiff herself cannot show that the 
injury will likely recur for her—as long as it is likely to recur 
for someone.133 
 
Controversy Clause—as they would be if mootness were actually applied as a 
constitutionally mandated limit on federal court jurisdiction.  Rather, as 
articulated and applied, they are based on prudential considerations, such as 
protection of judicial efficiency and authority, the preference for sufficiently-
motivated [sic] parties, and avoidance of party gamesmanship.  The frequent 
invocation of these exceptions by federal courts is thus hard to reconcile with 
the conventional understanding of mootness as a constitutionally mandated 
jurisdictional bar.”). 
129. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 490 (1996) (“These 
exceptions are incomprehensible if federal courts lack Article III jurisdiction 
to resolve moot cases at all.”). 
130. See, e.g., Honig, 484 U.S. at 317–320. 
131. 13C WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.8 
(3d ed. 2015). 
132. Pregnancy is a classic example.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 125 (1973).  Thus, mootness admits of an exception that standing does 
not.  In Lyons, the court held that the plaintiff could not maintain his action 
(that is, had no standing) because he could not show that he would likely be 
put in a choke-hold again.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 
(1983). 
133. Majors v. Abell, 317 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2003) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (“Furthermore, while canonical statements of the 
exception to mootness for cases capable of repetition but evading review 
require that the dispute giving rise to the case be capable of repetition by the 
same plaintiff, the courts, perhaps to avoid complicating lawsuits with 
incessant interruptions to assure the continued existence of a live 
controversy, do not interpret the requirement literally, at least in abortion 
and election cases, and possibly more generally, though we needn’t worry 
about that. If a suit attacking an abortion statute has dragged on for several 
years after the plaintiff’s pregnancy terminated, the court does not conduct a 
hearing on whether she may have fertility problems or may have decided that 
she doesn’t want to become pregnant again. And similarly in an election case 
the court will not keep interrogating the plaintiff to assess the likely 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
  
2016 WAIVING JURISDICTION 881 
These cases no longer present a live case or controversy 
between the parties and, in that respect, they fail the Article 
III requirement.  Yet, the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-
review cases persist to resolution in federal court because of a 
judicially crafted exception to the constitutional mandate.134  It 
makes sense for courts to keep these cases so that a resolution 
may be reached.  Otherwise, the short duration of the injury 
would doom these disputes to endless purgatory with no 
resolution.  Rather than continually starting and stopping the 
litigation, the court simply permits the case to proceed to 
judgment, allowing a final resolution of the issue sooner rather 
than later (or perhaps never). 
Another exception to mootness—voluntary cessation—
allows a court to keep a case that lost its adversity because the 
defendant ceased performing the objectionable conduct, unless 
the defendant makes it absolutely clear that it will not resume 
the conduct.135  When a defendant stops engaging in the 
objectionable conduct, the dispute between the parties ceases to 
exist; unlike the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review 
cases, other persons do not have the same dispute. 
Nonetheless, courts generally retain these cases so that the 
defendant who has ceased the objectionable conduct is not free 
to resume again once the court dismisses the case.  To preclude 
the defendant from being able to control the course of litigation 
by starting and stopping its actions, the court continues 
adjudicating the case, unless the defendant makes a strong 
showing that it will not resume the conduct.136  And the court 
 
trajectory of his political career.”). 
134. Katherine Florey, Comment, Insufficiently Jurisdictional: The Case 
Against Treating State Sovereign Immunity as an Article III Doctrine, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1422 (2004) (“Federal question jurisdiction is, after all, a 
question of the extent of the court’s power, not an attempt to balance costs 
and benefits.”). 
135. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (citation omitted) (noting it must be “absolutely 
clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected 
to recur”); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) 
(“It is well settled that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged 
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality 
of the practice.”); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) 
(explaining that voluntary cessation does not always moot a case; if it did, the 
defendant would be “free to return to his old ways”). 
136. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (citation omitted) (“The ‘heavy 
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does not merely hold the matter in abeyance in case the 
defendant resumes the conduct.  The matter proceeds because 
of a hypothetical adversity that may rear its head if the court 
were to dismiss the case and the defendant then recommenced 
its bad acts.  Courts allow the matter to continue because that 
makes practical sense.137 
Similar analysis applies to the third principal exception to 
mootness: class actions.138  In some situations, a class action 
may proceed even if the class representative’s case no longer 
presents a live controversy.139  In this scenario, courts are 
driven by the fact that other class members still have live 
claims; that is, despite the fact that the class representative no 
longer has a personal interest in the substantive outcome, the 
case still presents live issues.140  In this situation as well, 
 
burden of persua[ding]’ the court that the challenged conduct cannot 
reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting 
mootness.”); W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632 (noting that a defendant should 
not be “free to return to his old ways” and that there is a “public interest in 
having the legality of the practices settled”). 
137. See Hall, supra note 127, at 580 (footnotes omitted) (“Another 
problem that would follow from the uniform application of a rule requiring 
dismissal of moot claims is that it would empower defendants unilaterally to 
eliminate federal jurisdiction by temporary reform. Where defendant’s own 
actions have mooted the plaintiff’s claim for relief, courts have naturally been 
quite reluctant to deny judicial review, in part because of the concern that 
defendant’s ‘reform’ may be fleeting or insincere, and that the challenged 
behavior will resume after the action has been dismissed.  Thus, federal 
courts have long greeted with skepticism assertions of mootness based on 
defendant’s voluntary discontinuance of the challenged conduct.”). 
138. Indeed, some have said that the class action exception is an 
expansion of the capable-of-repetition-but-evading-review exception.  See id. 
at 583 (“The class action exception . . . might best be understood as an 
expansion of the capable-of-repetition exception to permit federal courts to 
review claims that are capable of repetition as to other class members, 
irrespective of whether they are also capable of repetition as to the named 
plaintiff.”). 
139. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975) (emphasis added) 
(“Although the controversy is no longer alive as to appellant Sosna, it 
remains very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to 
represent. Like the other voters in Dunn, new residents of Iowa are aggrieved 
by an allegedly unconstitutional statute enforced by state officials. We believe 
that a case such as this, in which, as in Dunn, the issue sought to be litigated 
escapes full appellate review at the behest of any single challenger, does not 
inexorably become moot by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to 
the named plaintiffs.”). 
140. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016); U.S. Parole 
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because other persons still possess adversity with the opposing 
party, the otherwise-dead case may proceed in federal court.141 
These three exceptions to mootness show that policy may—
at times—trump constitutional limits on court authority.  In all 
three scenarios, cases that lack the typical “liveness” or 
“adversity” requirements nonetheless proceed.  In other words, 
the case or controversy requirement that gives rise to the 
mootness doctrine is a constitutional, structural limitation 
that, under certain limited and defined circumstances, can be 
overlooked. 
 
B.  State Sovereign Immunity 
 
Sovereign immunity provides another example of a 
waivable jurisdictional doctrine.  State sovereign immunity is 
the privilege of the sovereign States not to be sued in federal 
court.142  The Eleventh Amendment limits “the judicial power 
of the United States.”143  In Pennhurst State School & Hospital 
v. Halderman, the Supreme Court described sovereign 
immunity as “a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial 
power established in Art[icle] III.”144  But immunity does not 
reside in the Eleventh Amendment alone; rather, sovereign 
immunity inheres in our constitutional structure as part of “our 
federalism.”145  Thus, sovereign immunity is an overarching, 
 
Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980). 
141. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404. 
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
143. Id. 
144. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 
(1984); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (“[F]or 
over a century now, we have made clear that the Constitution does not 
provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.”); 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (noting that immunity 
“restricts the judicial power under Article III”).  But see Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
(analogizing immunity to individual constitutional rights); Idaho v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (“The [Eleventh] Amendment, in 
other words, enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a 
nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 
145. Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the 
31
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omnipresent doctrine that limits the sweep of Article III 
jurisdiction for federal courts and even limits the scope of state 
judicial power.146  The United States Supreme Court calls state 
immunity “jurisdictional” for federal courts.147 
Despite state sovereign immunity’s pedigree as 
constitutional, structural, and even jurisdictional, sovereign 
immunity is not absolute.148  Courts have fashioned several 
exceptions to the constitutional doctrine.  Suits alleging 
ongoing violations of federal law may be initiated against state 
 
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1223 (2003) (“Thus, 
under both the official theory and the diversity theory, the possibility of 
waiver of state sovereign immunity ultimately stems from a recognition that 
the immunity bar does not derive from a textual, constitutional limit on 
federal judicial power, but from background principles of sovereign immunity 
(common law principles, diversity theorists would say; constitutional 
principles, according to the official theory).”). 
146. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign 
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of 
the Eleventh Amendment.  Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its 
history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the 
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which 
the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they 
retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union 
upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of 
the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”). 
147.  Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (internal quotations 
omitted) (“For over a century now, this Court has consistently made clear 
that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States was not 
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the 
United States.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (noting 
immunity “partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”); Bradford C. Clark, 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1817, 1833 (2010) (“Similarly, the Amendment is framed as a restriction on 
‘[t]he Judicial power’ and therefore limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized 
by Article III.”). 
148. 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 3524 (“But there are 
extremely important exceptions to [sovereign 
immunity].  Sovereign immunity does not bar suits against a state brought by 
the United States or by or another state. . . .  There is authority for the 
commonsense proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an 
interstate commission created by Congress from enforcing the terms of an 
interstate compact from bringing suit against a signatory state in federal 
court.”).  There are other exceptions as well.  Congress may abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
states may waive their immunity.  See In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d 
760, 765 (2d Cir. 2004).  Sovereign immunity could not be otherwise.  Federal 
law reigns supreme and, therefore, binds even the states.  If they violate 
federal law, they must be held accountable in some manner. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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officers for prospective, nonmonetary relief, despite the 
realistic appraisal that such suits are, in all but name, suits 
against the state itself, and so intrude on sovereign 
immunity.149  The United States and other States may sue a 
state, and that State may not defend itself by pleading its 
sovereign status.150  Congress may abrogate immunity when 
acting under certain, limited powers, most notably Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.151  Alternatively, Congress may 
condition receipt of federal monies on the waiver of 
immunity.152  In each of these instances, the constitutional, 
structural nature of state sovereign immunity bows to some 
other need of the justice system—perhaps an individual’s need 
to vindicate his own rights, or a neighbor State’s need to defend 
itself against the sued state’s belligerence, or Congress’s desire 
to encourage states to comply with important federal laws.  
Each of these exceptions undermines sovereign immunity. 
There is yet another exception to state sovereign immunity 
of particular importance to this Article: a State may waive 
immunity.153  The State  may do so intentionally by 
affirmatively deciding to proceed with the suit.154  Or it may 
waive sovereign immunity unintentionally.  In Lapides v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, the United States 
 
149. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
150. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904); United 
States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642–46 (1892).  Textually, these exceptions 
make sense.  The Eleventh Amendment applies when the plaintiff is a 
“citizen,” not when the plaintiff is the government.  13 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 21, § 3524. 
151. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to 
enforce the amendment through appropriate legislation, which permits 
congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.  See also Cent. Va. Cmty. 
Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378–79 (2006) (holding that Congress may 
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause); 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).  But see Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate state 
sovereign immunity when acting under its commerce clause powers). 
152. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (permitting Congress’s 
condition of 5% of federal highway money as not too coercive). 
153. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that a state 
may waive its claim to sovereign immunity by intervening in a suit). 
154. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (“[I]f a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar the action.”), superseded by statute as stated in 
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). 
33
  
886 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
Supreme Court held that the State of Georgia had waived its 
sovereign immunity when it removed the case from state court 
to federal court.155  The Court reasoned as follows: despite 
being involuntarily dragged into state court, Georgia 
voluntarily chose to invoke the powers of the federal courts by 
removing the action.156  Waiver, whether unintentional or 
intentional, has become part of the sovereign immunity 
doctrine. 
In sum, state sovereign immunity exists in the 
constitutional structure and inheres in “our federalism.”  The 
Supreme Court calls the doctrine jurisdictional and recognizes 
it as a limit on federal judicial power.  Nonetheless, this 
constitutional, structural, even quasi-jurisdictional doctrine 
has exceptions and may be waived by an unintended misstep 
early in the litigation process. 
 
C.  Territorial Conception of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Courts are also restricted in which defendants they may 
subject to their powers.  Personal jurisdiction limits states from 
reaching out beyond their borders to drag non-consenting 
defendants before their courts if the defendants have not 
created meaningful contacts with the state.157  This limitation 
 
155. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 
(2002); see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (holding that 
a state waives immunity when it sues in federal court); Gunter v. Atl. Coast 
Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a State voluntarily 
become[s] a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial 
determination, it will be bound thereby, and cannot escape the result of its 
own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the [Eleventh] 
Amendment.”); Clark, 108 U.S. at 436  (noting that a state’s voluntary 
appearance as intervener in federal court waives sovereign immunity). 
156. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620. 
157. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations 
omitted) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in 
personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.  
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was 
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.   But now 
that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of 
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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derives from the Constitution, particularly the Due Process 
Clause.158  Although in modern times, the common wisdom is 
that personal jurisdiction is a personal right—the right not to 
be sued in an unfair, inconvenient forum with which the 
defendant has few contacts—the older conception of personal 
jurisdiction was territory- and sovereignty-based.159  It is that 
older conception of personal jurisdiction that provides some 
insight into structural, constitutional doctrines that are 
nonetheless waivable. 
The older Pennoyer framework sprang from the notion that 
courts in one state have no authority to reach beyond their 
borders to adjudicate extraterritorial disputes or to levy 
binding judgments on defendants who are not present in the 
territory.160  Even the name behind long-arm statutes suggests 
a territorial base: the long arm of the state had to reach beyond 
its borders.  Personal jurisdiction was a structural, boundary-
based doctrine. 
The territorial conception of personal jurisdiction 
eventually gave way to a fairness notion.161  But to do that, the 
courts, including the Supreme Court, had to reframe the 
doctrine from a limitation on court power to one involving 
personal freedom.162  By the 1980s, the personal-rights aspect 
of personal jurisdiction had overtaken the sovereignty-based 
 
play and substantial justice.’”). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. (citation omitted) (noting that “[h]istorically . . . presence within 
the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of a 
judgment personally binding him”). 
160. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) (“The authority of every 
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which 
it is established.”). 
161. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980) (blending the territorial notion and the fairness notion by noting 
that personal jurisdiction “protects the defendant against the burdens of 
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum” and that it “ensure[s] that the 
States through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system”). 
162. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982) (stating that personal jurisdiction “represents a 
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty” and explaining the shift from territorial-based to fairness-
based analysis in a footnote). 
35
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idea.163  Today, however, the territorial notion of personal 
jurisdiction may be making a comeback.164  Cases like Nicastro 
speak once again in terms of sovereign authority.  The 
territorial notion of personal jurisdiction may once again come 
into vogue.  Or it may not. 
Whatever happens to the concept of personal jurisdiction 
in the future (whether it remains primarily a personal right or 
reverts to a largely structural limitation), in the era when 
personal jurisdiction was considered a territorial limitation, the 
issue still had to be raised by the defendant, not the court, and 
had to be raised early, lest the defendant be deemed to have 
consented to jurisdiction.165  Thus, personal jurisdiction is 
constitutional, and at some points in history, has been 
considered structural.  Yet, it has always been waivable. 
 
III. Toward a Theory of Jurisdictional Waiver 
 
The roadblock—the purportedly inflexible nature of 
subject-matter jurisdiction defects—has been identified and 
dismantled.  Wellness International shows a willingness by the 
Supreme Court to adjust its understanding of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  And, as just explored, the system already permits 
other structural constitutional rights to be deemed waived if 
not timely raised.  Subject-matter jurisdiction should be 
treated more like these structural constitutional rights.  
Mootness, sovereign immunity, and (territorial) personal 
jurisdiction, singly, and in combination, offer insight into how 
our system could accommodate subject-matter jurisdiction’s 
constitutional status without resorting to the harsh rules that 
currently govern the doctrine.  This section lays a new path for 
 
163. Id. 
164. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the plurality opinion 
continually references sovereign power. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  The plurality 
does recognize that personal jurisdiction limits judicial power as a matter of 
liberty, not sovereignty, but immediately thereafter states that “whether a 
judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority 
to render it.”  Id. at 2789. 
165. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (4th 
ed. 2015) (describing Pennoyer and stating “the Supreme Court did recognize 
that a person could waive a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person and 
thereby consent to jurisdiction”). 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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subject-matter jurisdiction by using these constitutional 
doctrines as prototypes for the treatment of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, while also addressing their shortcomings as 
analogies. 
 
A.  Mootness as a Roadmap 
 
Mootness provides support for allowing policy (at times) to 
trump certain constitutional requirements.  When a federal 
court dismisses a case as moot, the court says that the parties 
lack continuing adversity, as required by the “case or 
controversy” language in Article III.  When a federal court 
refuses to dismiss a case as moot because of an exception, the 
court acknowledges the substantial sunk costs and the need for 
a resolution to serve policy concerns other than those espoused 
by the “case or controversy” requirement.  Thus, weighty 
practical policy considerations can be accommodated within 
constitutional doctrine. 
The Court’s treatment of mootness sheds light on how 
subject-matter jurisdiction should be treated.  With respect to 
subject-matter jurisdiction, the policy would not be, as in the-
capable-of-repetition exception, that future parties will benefit 
from knowing the court’s resolution of the matter.  Rather, the 
policy is the broader policy found within the mootness 
exceptions generally; namely, that there are substantial sunk 
costs.  And, indeed, federal subject-matter jurisdiction cases 
suffer from substantial sunk costs. 
The Federal Supplement and the Federal Reporter contain 
thousands of examples of cases that have proceeded far in the 
litigation process, only to be dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.166  Some subject-matter jurisdiction 
dismissals are well known: Mottley and Kroger fall into this 
category.167  Others, such as Belleri v. United States,168 
 
166. Buehler, supra note 58, at 656. 
167. See supra Section I.A.1; Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S. 365 (1978); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 
(1908).  
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Builders Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dragas Management,169 and 
Arena v. Graybar,170 are less well-known.  But all of these 
cases—the ones that make it through pre-answer motions, 
through pleadings, through discovery, and to trial or beyond—
pose substantial costs to our legal system in terms of court time 
(the judge’s, law clerk’s, and other court administrators’ time), 
not to mention substantial costs to the parties and lawyers.  If 
sunk costs can provide a reason for not dismissing a moot case, 
perhaps sunk costs should provide a reason for not dismissing 
a live case that may have been filed in the wrong court.171 
That sentiment has already found some traction in the 
federal courts.  Although federal courts do belatedly dismiss 
cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, sometimes courts 
struggle to find exceptions that allow them to retain a matter 
despite its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.172  The mootness 
analogy will allow federal courts to continue to act in this 
manner, but will regularize and legitimize the practice. 
Objectors may complain.  The Constitution does not say 
anything about mootness, and all of the policy-based exceptions 
further prove that mootness is not a strong constitutional 
principle.173  Therefore, they may say, mootness does not 
provide a firm foundation from which to show that 
constitutional doctrines may be waived. 
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the first 
argument by recognizing mootness as a constitutional 
 
169. See supra Section I.A.1; Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt. 
Corp., No. 11-1722, 2012 WL 5861255 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2012). 
170. See supra Section I.A.1; Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., 669 F.3d 214 
(5th Cir. 2012). 
171. Cases that are clearly filed in the wrong court should have been 
discovered before trial or other disposition of the merits. 
172. Berch, supra note 29, at 656–75. 
173. Hall, supra note 127, at 563 (“[C]ourts routinely hear moot cases 
where strong prudential reasons exist to do so—a practice that cannot be 
reconciled with the belief that mootness is a mandatory jurisdictional bar. . . . 
Courts and scholars refer to the doctrines under which courts elect to hear 
moot cases as ‘exceptions’ to the mootness bar, but these exceptions do not 
‘prove the rule’—they debunk it.  The exceptions to mootness do not appear to 
be based on any interpretation of Article III’s Case or Controversy Clause—as 
they would be if mootness were actually applied as a constitutionally 
mandated limit on federal court jurisdiction.”). 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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doctrine.174  The second argument is bootstrapping.  To say a 
doctrine is not constitutional because there are sub-
constitutional exceptions goes too far.  Subject-matter 
jurisdiction, too, has exceptions.175  That fact does not de-
constitutionalize subject-matter jurisdiction.  In the same vein, 
mootness, despite admitting of policy-based exceptions, still 
ranks as constitutional.176  Like the other justiciability 
doctrines, mootness springs from the cases or controversies 
requirement of Article III.  Courts count it among 
constitutional requirements.  And the United States Supreme 
Court has clearly announced that mootness is a constitutional 
doctrine.177 
An objector might also say “enough is enough.”  Mootness 
should not admit of sub-constitutional exceptions; if anything, 
we should eliminate the exceptions for mootness, rather than 
expand the rationale underlying them to cover subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  That is one route: eliminate the exceptions for 
mootness and thereby bring mootness into conformity with 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  But the other route also lies open: 
the Court’s acceptance of policy-based exceptions to mootness 
opens the door for policy-based exceptions to other doctrines 
that find their basis in the “case or controversy” requirement of 
Article III.  Both mootness and jurisdiction arise from that 
language.  And both could be subject to the same, limited policy 
exceptions found in the mootness doctrine. 
 
* * * 
 
Imperfect boundaries exist between the state and federal 
courts.  Scholars, Supreme Court Justices, lower federal court 
judges, and practitioners will disagree about which cases, for 
example, evidence a sufficiently strong embedded federal 
question to make them cognizable in federal court.178  Courts 
 
174. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 307 (1964). 
175. See supra Section I.A.2. 
176. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726–27 (2013). 
177. Liner, 375 U.S. at 306 n.3. 
178. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 
(1986) (determining in a 5-4 decision that the case did not present an 
embedded federal question). 
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have undoubtedly made mistakes with respect to individual 
cases.  Surely, federal courts have heard some cases that 
should have been heard in state court, and state courts likely 
have heard cases better suited for the federal system.  The 
boundary between the state and federal system is pliable. 
Given all of that, is the system really harmed if a federal 
court keeps a case that—to all involved—initially appeared to 
raise a federal issue (or to have diverse parties), but that 
months or years into the process reveals itself not to have that 
Article III requirement?  The boundary between the state and 
federal systems might blur slightly in these situations, but the 
boundaries are not clean even now. 
The mootness analogy is not on all fours with subject-
matter jurisdiction.  But the Article does not suggest that these 
other constitutional doctrines provide perfect blueprints for our 
treatment of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The purpose in citing 
them is more modest than that; it is simply to highlight that 
our system has found ways to permit cases raising similar 
types of constitutional impediments to proceed, and to argue 
that our system should treat subject-matter jurisdiction in a 
similar fashion.  The “flexible character of the Art[icle] III 
mootness doctrine” should be imported to subject-matter 
jurisdiction.179 
 
B.  Sovereign Immunity as a Roadmap 
 
While mootness provides a roadmap for treating 
constitutional matters as ignorable by the court when policy 
dictates, sovereign immunity provides a roadmap for treating 
constitutional matters as waivable by parties if the case 
proceeds to a certain point before the parties raise the issue. 
Sovereign immunity is constitutional and (at least quasi) 
jurisdictional, yet waivable—even waivable by mistake.180  By 
removing a case from state to federal court, state defendants 
implicitly agree to submit to federal jurisdiction, including the 
 
179. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980). 
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assertion of additional claims by the plaintiffs.181  The Supreme 
Court has noted that sovereign immunity functions differently 
from other constitutionally compelled jurisdictional doctrines: 
sovereign immunity is a constitutional defense to suit, but it 
can be waived; the defense is jurisdictional and may be raised 
on appeal, but a federal district court does not need to police 
immunity for the state.182  Thus, not all values that find their 
genesis in the Constitution are “inflexible and without 
exception,” not even all constitutional, jurisdictional doctrines. 
By Supreme Court mandate, then, sovereign immunity 
contains an interesting blend of attributes.  The Eleventh 
Amendment limits federal judicial power.183  The limitation is 
constitutional and, as such, should be mandatory, not 
precatory; consent or inaction cannot excuse the failure to 
comply with a constitutional limitation on federal courts’ 
power.  Yet, sovereign immunity is also subject to waiver or 
consent.  This blending of attributes seems to work for 
sovereign immunity.184  It works because, as Professor Siegel 
comments, “[P]ermitting assertion of state sovereign immunity 
at any time is simply not a sensible way to run a judicial 
system.  It allows unfair tactics that would never be tolerated if 
used by other parties, and it wastes the resources of the 
plaintiff and the judicial system itself.”185 
Allowing the assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction 
defects at any time is also not sensible.  It may allow unfair 
tactics186 and waste valuable resources.  So why not treat 
subject-matter jurisdiction—even constitutional subject-matter 
jurisdiction—in the same fashion as sovereign immunity?187  
 
181. Id. at 620. 
182. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998). 
183. See supra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
184. Perhaps it works because of the Court’s recognition that sovereign 
immunity is not, after all, derived from the Eleventh Amendment as a 
limitation on the power of the federal courts but is, instead inherent in our 
constitutional structure.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he 
sovereign immunity of the states neither derives from, nor is limited by, the 
terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”). 
185. Siegel, supra note 145, at 1228. 
186. See generally Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 
(1978). 
187. Or perhaps this reasoning suggests a different solution: rather than 
treating subject-matter jurisdiction like immunity (quasi-jurisdictional, yet 
41
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That is, acknowledge its basis as a constitutional jurisdictional 
limitation, yet also acknowledge its waivability under certain 
conditions.  By filing in federal court and allowing the case to 
continue in federal court, at some point, the parties and the 
federal court should be deemed to have waived their objections 
to lack of federal-court power.188  This would accord with the 
system’s treatment of sovereign immunity. 
Here, too, there may be objectors.  Some may complain 
that sovereign immunity is an inapt analogy for subject-matter 
jurisdiction because sovereign immunity is constitutional and 
personal, while subject-matter jurisdiction is constitutional and 
structural.  Surely personal rights can be waived, even if of 
constitutional stature.  An individual may waive the right to a 
civil jury trial, Fourth Amendment protections, Miranda 
rights, or any other of the many personal protections the 
Constitution grants.189  If, rather than a structural right, state 
 
waivable), perhaps immunity should not be treated like subject-matter 
jurisdiction (that is, should not be considered jurisdictional), but instead like 
a personal right (more akin to personal jurisdiction).  See Schacht, 524 U.S. 
at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that sovereign immunity may be 
characterized as a matter of personal jurisdiction).  In her student Comment, 
Professor Katherine Florey argued that sovereign immunity’s quasi-
jurisdictional, yet waivable, status is untenable: “As the previous discussion 
attempts to show, the Supreme Court has frequently alluded to sovereign 
immunity as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, while continuing to 
develop the doctrine in ways that call that view into question. This 
inconsistency is of more than theoretical importance.  The existence of these 
essentially irreconcilable perspectives in Supreme Court precedent has 
created great difficulties for the lower courts.  Since federal courts cannot 
overstep the limits of their subject matter jurisdiction, but also cannot 
arbitrarily decline to exercise jurisdiction they possess, the question of 
sovereign immunity’s jurisdictional status is an important and urgent issue 
that lower courts have been obliged to address.”  Florey, supra note 134, at 
1417 (citation omitted).  But rather than worry about sovereign immunity’s 
characterization, we ought to change the rules of jurisdiction.  The 
“inconsistency” she finds in sovereign immunity is just one aspect of the 
larger schizophrenia involving any defect that may be labeled “jurisdictional.” 
188. This may lead to a more rigorous screening of cases on the front 
end, particularly by the court itself.  In my opinion, that is a boon to the 
system.  If courts more closely analyze subject-matter jurisdiction at the 
outset of cases, then fewer cases will proceed for any length of time before 
potential defects are uncovered. 
189. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1943–44 
(2015) (discussing various personal constitutional protections that 
individuals may waive).  An individual may knowingly waive these personal 
rights.  Sovereign immunity, however, inhering in the structure of our 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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sovereign immunity is a personal right, of course it is 
waivable—and that fact would provide scant support for the 
argument that subject-matter jurisdiction should be waivable. 
Even if state sovereign immunity partakes of some 
personal attributes in that it protects one party from suit in 
federal court, sovereign immunity also partakes of some 
structural attributes.190  The relationship between states and 
the courts is structural, as is the limitation on court power that 
flows from that relationship.  Both scholarship and cases 
recognize the structural nature of sovereign immunity, which 
comes in part from the fact that the Eleventh Amendment 
limits Article III’s sweep.191  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
referred to immunity as a “jurisdictional bar”—a restriction on 
“the judicial power of the United States.”192  And, at least 
sometimes, courts permit immunity to be raised for the first 
time on appeal—just like a subject-matter jurisdiction defect—
indicating its structural, nonpersonal status.193 
At least some core notion of sovereign immunity is 
jurisdictional.  The freedom from suit by a non-citizen—the 
most limited vision of the Eleventh Amendment—is a textual 
limitation on federal court jurisdiction.194  Yet, the federal 
courts permit waiver even in this circumstance. 
 
Constitution and in the relationship between the states and the federal 
government, partakes of at least some structural aspects. 
190. In Wellness International, the Supreme Court recognized that 
Article III has both personal and structural implications.  But see generally 
Florey, supra note 134. 
191. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. 
L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1992) (advocating that sovereign immunity doctrine helps 
“maintain a proper balance among the branches of the federal government”). 
192. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974); see also United States 
ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., 173 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(describing sovereign immunity as “sufficiently jurisdictional”). 
193. This provides yet another reason to untangle the web of 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional.  Sovereign immunity should not 
“sometimes” be waivable but sometimes be nonwaivable.  How is a party or a 
court to know how to proceed? 
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
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Others may object that sovereign immunity is an imperfect 
analogy to subject-matter jurisdiction because sovereign 
immunity is not wholly constitutional.  But, at the very least, 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment bars diversity suits 
against a state.  These cases, at a minimum, pose a structural 
limitation on federal-court power, even if other iterations of 
sovereign immunity are not found in the Constitution and 
therefore provide an inapt analogy for subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  In addition, courts have expanded the Eleventh 
Amendment beyond its text and have called these expansions 
of sovereign immunity constitutional as well, suggesting that 
immunity, in addition to being “sufficiently jurisdictional,” is 
also “sufficiently constitutional.”195 
 
* * * 
 
No analogy will be perfect, but the rationale behind the 
approval of waiving sovereign immunity helps to bend the rigid 
thinking that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived 
because it is structural and constitutional.  Sovereign 
immunity, even if an imperfect model, nonetheless provides 
relevant comparison points.  Sovereign immunity has at least 
some structural aspects, even if the right to raise the defense is 
personal to the particular state involved in the litigation; 
sovereign immunity has some roots in the constitution, even if 
it is sometimes treated as extra-constitutional.  In sum, 
sovereign immunity has some constitutional and structural 
aspects, and yet sovereign immunity is waivable. 
 
C.   Territorial Personal Jurisdiction as a Roadmap 
 
The third prototype for a new treatment of subject-matter 
jurisdiction is the territorial conception of personal jurisdiction.  
Territorial limitations on a federal court’s power are structural, 
rooted in sovereignty notions, and constitutional.  Yet even 
when courts considered personal jurisdiction a territorial 
limitation, rather than a personal right, they relied on 
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defendants to raise objections, and those objections had to be 
raised early.196  The previous treatment of personal jurisdiction 
as territorial provides yet another example of a structural, 
constitutional right that can be waived, either intentionally or 
by inaction. 
The old conception of personal jurisdiction as structural, 
constitutional, and waivable is particularly powerful given 
personal jurisdiction’s treatment as waivable by the slightest 
missteps of a defendant who appears in court without first 
raising his personal jurisdiction objection.  If subject-matter 
jurisdiction receives such lauded treatment in our doctrine 
because of its structural and constitutional status, surely 
personal jurisdiction’s treatment otherwise should give us 
pause. 
The primary objection to this comparison to subject-matter 
jurisdiction is likely that personal jurisdiction is no longer 
considered a structural limitation, making the analogy 
historical at best.197  Times change.  Today, personal 
jurisdiction protects individuals, not sister states and, of 
course, individuals can waive their personal rights.  A 
defendant may choose to raise the issue or not—entirely his 
choice. 
Nonetheless, the fact that personal jurisdiction was once 
considered structural, constitutional, and still waivable shows 
that constitutional imperatives that are conceived of as 
structural limitations on the power of the courts can 
nonetheless be waived.  Personal jurisdiction had to be raised 
at the earliest point in litigation in order to avoid waiver.  If 
the defendant failed to raise the objection, the court, which had 
previously lacked the power to adjudicate the extraterritorial 
action, was vested with such power.198  In fact, even when 
personal jurisdiction was boundary-based, courts themselves 
did not raise the issue.  The fact that this structural doctrine 
was protectable only by the defendant shows just how flexible 
 
196. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 165, § 1064. 
197. If you are concerned with history, consider this: subject-matter 
jurisdiction used to be waivable.  And it could be “consented” to by the 
parties, merely by pleading its existence.  See Berch, supra note 29, at 685–88 
(recounting historical practice). 
198. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 165, § 1064. 
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the constitutional lexicon can be. 
Another objection may be made to the timing with which 
personal jurisdiction defects must be raised.  Defendants must 
raise the issue at the beginning of the litigation.199  That is 
simply too early for subject-matter jurisdiction defects, an 
objector may say. 
This objection has merit, but does not undermine the 
comparison.  The territorial conception of personal jurisdiction 
helps us understand that structural constitutional rights are 
waivable.  We do not need to accept the accelerated time frame 
that covers personal jurisdiction defects.  There is no reason to 
require parties or the court to raise a subject-matter 
jurisdiction defect at the very outset of litigation.200  That 
timeframe may not provide sufficient protection for the 
structural rights inherent in subject-matter jurisdiction (even 
though, clearly, that timeframe would be more efficient in 
terms of fewer sunk costs).201 
 
* * * 
 
Personal jurisdiction thus also buttresses the position that 
constitutional doctrines that limit court power may nonetheless 
be waived (and indeed, may be waived early in the case). 
 
D.  Overall Roadmap 
 
Mootness, sovereign immunity, and territorial personal 
jurisdiction provide insights into how our system should treat 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  None of the three doctrines 
provides a perfect analogy.  Mootness suffers from the defect 
that constitutional doctrine is subordinated too easily to policy-
based rationales; sovereign immunity, from the defect that it 
may be characterized as personal to the state defendant; and 
 
199. 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1391 (3d 
ed. 2015). 
200. But see Gao, supra note 84, at 2379–80; Buehler, supra note 58, at 
657–58. 
201. Here again, the Aristotelian mean is preferable.  The timeframe 
proposed avoids the inefficiency of substantial sunk costs, while still 
respecting structural constitutional limitations. 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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personal jurisdiction, from the defect that, at least in modern 
times, it is, as its name has always suggested, personal rather 
than structural.  But each doctrine also offers guidance for the 
treatment and potential waiver of subject-matter jurisdiction 
defects. 
Sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction are 
waivable; if not timely and appropriately objected to, the case 
proceeds.  Mootness is ignorable for policy reasons; if raised, 
but overcome, the case proceeds.  These constitutional 
doctrines provide roadmaps for how we should think about and 
treat subject-matter jurisdiction defects, even constitutional 
ones.  In the ordinary course of events (that is, in cases not 
tainted by fraud or collusion), if the court and the parties do 
not uncover the subject-matter jurisdiction defect until the 
commencement of trial, that defect should be deemed waived 
because the costs to the parties and the judicial system are so 
great.  Like sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction, the 
issue is waived.  But unlike those doctrines, the reason for 
waiver lies not in the fact that the right is partially personal to 
a party and that party must assert it.  Like the mootness 
exceptions, the reason for waiver lies in the fact that there are 
tremendous costs to the system in abandoning a case in which 
the parties and the courts have so much invested.  In sum, the 
system’s structural interest should be outweighed by the sunk 
cost inherent in the failure to raise the issue in a timely 
fashion.  Thus, the case for waiver of constitutional subject-
matter jurisdiction defects pulls from our system’s treatment of 
mootness, sovereign immunity, and personal jurisdiction. 
 
 
IV. Emanations to Other Doctrines 
 
The proposal in this Article, if adopted, would help resolve 
inefficiencies and alleviate the pressure in several hundred 
cases a year caused by the inflexible treatment of subject-
matter jurisdiction as unwaivable.  But that is not all.  The 
solution posed in this Article has emanations beyond subject-
matter jurisdiction to other justiciability doctrines that 
sometimes masquerade as jurisdictional.  The new treatment 
would facilitate analysis in these areas in two ways: first, late-
47
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raised defects of any variety would not necessarily cause cases 
to be dismissed; second, courts would not have to try to 
determine which defects relate to “subject-matter” and which 
do not.  In sum, by working our way out of the quagmire of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, we can create a uniform way of 
treating some of our other troubled, and trouble-causing, 
doctrines as well. 
 
A.  Justiciability Doctrines 
 
Standing and ripeness are prime examples of other defects 
that should be deemed waived if not raised by the time of trial 
or any disposition on the merits of the action.202  Both are 
constitutional in origin, stemming from the “case or 
controversy” language of Article III (just like mootness).203  
Both are also structural, acting as limits on the federal courts’ 
power to entertain cases.204  Currently, a suggestion that a case 
is unripe or that a plaintiff lacks standing can derail an action, 
even on appeal.205  But if we accept that jurisdictional defects, 
even constitutional ones, must be raised by the time of trial or 
any disposition on the merits, then there is no strong reason for 
treating these other doctrines any differently. 
 
202. Black’s Law Dictionary defines standing as “[a] party’s right to 
make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right” and 
ripeness as “[t]he state of a dispute that has reached, but has not passed, the 
point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and 
useful decision to be made.”  Standing & Ripeness, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
203. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993) (“We 
have noted that ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations 
on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(“Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that 
are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an 
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III.”). 
204. Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18 (discussing ripeness requirement); United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (“Relaxation of standing 
requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power.”). 
205. E.g., Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 443 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted) (“[S]tanding to sue is a jurisdictional issue of constitutional 
dimensions, and it may be raised and addressed for the first time on 
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If courts treat these doctrines as waivable, parties will 
have incentives to raise the issue earlier in the litigation.  With 
respect to both standing and ripeness, each of which has 
constitutional and prudential components, courts will not have 
to determine whether a failing is one or the other and treat the 
outcomes differently depending on the label.206  All defects will 
be deemed waived by the same cutoff: the beginning of trial or 
disposition on the merits.  Courts will also have less need to 
draw a stark line between an unripe case (which admits of no 
exceptions) and a once-ripe-but-now-moot case (which may be 
subject to an exception) because both objections would be 
waived if first raised after trial has begun. 
In sum, parties would have sufficient time and incentive to 
raise these defects.  They would just need to raise them earlier 
in the litigation and not wait until trial or appeals. 
 
B.  Exhaustion of Remedies 
 
Exhaustion of remedies may be another area that would 
benefit from the waiver analysis advocated in this Article.  
Some statutes require plaintiffs to take certain administrative 
steps before they may file suit.207  When so required, plaintiffs 
must exhaust these administrative remedies and, if they fail to 
do so, they cannot seek redress in district court.  Federal courts 
currently have trouble deciding whether or not the issue 
qualifies as jurisdictional.  This presents problems in the 
current system because jurisdictional issues cannot be waived, 
while nonjurisdictional ones can be.208  One manifestation of 
the problematic label is that some courts permit the sua sponte 
dismissal for failing to exhaust administrative remedies,209 
 
206. Reno, 509 U.S. at 57 n.18 (noting constitutional and prudential 
components of ripeness); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (noting constitutional and 
prudential components of standing). 
207. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012) (exhaustion of remedies in Title 
VII). 
208. See, e.g., Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Schs., 715 F.3d 775, 784–85 
(10th Cir. 2013) (describing the circuit split regarding whether exhaustion is 
jurisdictional under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); 5B 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 1350 (noting both characterizations of 
exhaustion). 
209. See, e.g., Brown v. Lebanon Corr. Inst., No. 1:09-CV-513, 2009 WL 
49
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while other courts do not even entertain the objection if raised 
late by the parties.210 
The difficulty of handling an issue like exhaustion of 
remedies may disappear if we create a less fraught way of 
handling jurisdictional defects.  After all, if even core, 
constitutional jurisdictional matters can be deemed waived if 
not timely raised, so too could statutory exhaustion of 
remedies, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.  
Courts would not have to label exhaustion as jurisdictional or 
nonjurisdictional because the jurisdictional label would not 
carry the harsh consequences that it currently does.  Moreover, 
it makes sense for exhaustion to be raised early because it is 
about the steps a party took before instituting the federal 
action.  These antecedent steps should be obviously present or 
obviously lacking—and courts and parties should waste no 
time litigating if they are lacking.  The sunk costs for the 
system in handling a case where the plaintiff failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies—and then dismissing that case in 
favor of exhaustion—are plain.  It is better to determine that 
failing early, rather than allowing the defect to be raised late in 
the proceeding. 
 
C.  Statutory Procedural Prerequisites Other than Exhaustion 
 
Some statutes set forth certain minimum requirements for 
a suit other than exhaustion of administrative remedies.  For 
example, Title VII requires that a defendant employ at least 
fifteen individuals.211  Still other prerequisites to suit include 
 
2913930, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2009) (dismissing the action sua sponte 
because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Clifford v. 
Louisiana, No. 07-955-C, 2008 WL 2754737, at *3 (M.D. La. July 7, 2008) 
(same). 
210. Under certain circumstances, the First Circuit has deemed the 
failure to exhaust a waivable objection.  See Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
641 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. 
Ct. 2126, 2140 (2012). 
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.”); see 
also id. § 12111(5)(A) (employee numerosity requirement for the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990). 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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filing within the applicable statute of limitations and filing 
required notices of claim.212  The question arises whether these 
requirements go to the district court’s power to adjudicate the 
dispute (jurisdiction) or to the merits of the plaintiff’s case 
(such that if the plaintiff does not plead or prove them, the 
plaintiff cannot prevail, although the court does have the power 
to determine that is the case).213 
Different courts have resolved the jurisdiction question 
differently—and as long as we treat jurisdictional defects so 
differently from other defects, the different resolutions are 
concerning.  Even more concerning, courts have been all too 
quick to label these prerequisites as jurisdictional without fully 
considering the ramifications of such a classification.214  For 
example, in Collins v. United Air Lines and Verzosa v. Merrill 
Lynch, the Ninth Circuit held that failure to file within 180 
days of an alleged discriminatory act deprives a district court of 
jurisdiction to hear a Title VII matter.215  In Verzosa, however, 
the Ninth Circuit then determined that the district court had 
jurisdiction because the defendant had stipulated to 
jurisdiction.216  If truly a matter of jurisdiction, that result 
makes no sense; under current doctrine, parties cannot confer 
jurisdiction by consent just as they cannot waive it by inaction.  
The Ninth Circuit explained the apparent inconsistency this 
 
212. See id. § 2000e-5(e) (requiring charges to be filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the allegedly 
discriminatory act). 
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982) (noting that certain procedural prerequisites “can plausibly be 
characterized either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of 
merits or procedure”); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and 
Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 654–59 (2005) (noting that courts have blurred 
the line between power and merits). 
214. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 45, § 1350 (citations omitted) 
(“Courts have recognized a variety of other defenses that one normally would 
not think of as raising subject-matter jurisdiction questions when considering 
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, such as claims that the plaintiff’s suit is barred by the 
governing statute of limitations, a matter that usually is thought of as a Rule 
8(c) affirmative defense; the action is not ripe for judicial adjudication; the 
claim is moot; the action is not justiciable; or the subject matter is one over 
which the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction.”). 
215. Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch et al., 589 F.2d 974, 976–77 (9th Cir. 
1978); Collins v. United Air Lines, Inc. 514 F.2d 594, 596 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975). 
216. Verzosa, 589 F.2d at 977. 
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way, stating, “Appellant’s stipulation to jurisdiction therefore 
must be construed as an admission that the alleged unlawful 
employment practices were continuing,” and thus the plaintiff-
appellee had brought a timely EEOC charge and the federal 
courts did have subject-matter jurisdiction.217  It is an 
uncomfortable resolution, and one that would not have been 
necessary had the court simply not called the defect 
“jurisdictional.” 
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court seemed to 
signal a shift away from calling these sorts of procedural 
prerequisites “jurisdictional” when, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
the Court held that the fifteen-employee requirement of Title 
VII is an element of the plaintiff’s case, not a question of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.218  The Court was “mindful of the 
consequences” of finding the employee-numerosity requirement 
jurisdictional rather than simply an element of the plaintiff’s 
case.219  Most notably, of course, is the consequence that 
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even by 
the courts, and even on appeal.220  The Supreme Court 
ultimately concluded that it would be unfair and a waste of 
judicial resources to retry the case, and labeled the fifteen-
employee requirement a “merits” issue rather than a 
“jurisdictional” one, while leaving open the possibility that 
Congress may rank such a requirement as jurisdictional in the 
future.221 
The United States Supreme Court’s resolution makes 
sense, particularly from the standpoint of waiver.  Although a 
plaintiff should not be able to prevail if she fails to plead and 
 
217. Id. 
218. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). 
219. Id. at 513–14 (emphasis added) (“We resolve the question whether 
that fact [the requirement of fifteen or more employees] is ‘jurisdictional’ or 
relates to the ‘merits’ of a Title VII claim mindful of the consequences of 
typing the 15-employee threshold a determinant of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, rather than an element of Arbaugh’s claim for relief.”). 
220. Id. at 506. 
221. Id. at 502 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (“Given the unfairness and waste of judicial resources 
entailed in tying the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter 
jurisdiction, we think it the sounder course to refrain from constricting § 1331 
or [Title VII’s jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C.] § 2000e-5(f)(3), and to leave 
the ball in Congress’ court.”). 
52http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/4
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prove that the employer employed at least fifteen people (a 
requirement of the statute),222 the failure does not seem so 
fundamental that the employer should be permitted to 
complain of it for the first time after an adverse verdict.  An 
employer that does not bother to raise the defect before trial 
should not be heard to complain about its own failure after 
judgment is rendered in the plaintiff’s favor. 
The Supreme Court has maintained that course, usually 
finding statutory prerequisites to suit to be nonjurisdictional.  
In the 2014 Term, the Court had occasion to consider whether 
the time limits in the Federal Tort Claims Act were 
jurisdictional, and the Court held that they were not.223  The 
Court reiterated its position that most statutory prerequisites 
to suit should be treated as nonjurisdictional: 
 
Given [the] harsh consequences [attached to 
jurisdictional rules], the Government must clear 
a high bar to establish that a statute of 
limitations is jurisdictional.  In recent years, we 
have repeatedly held that procedural rules, 
including time bars, cabin a court’s power only if 
Congress has “clearly state[d]” as much.  
“[A]bsent such a clear statement, . . . ‘courts 
should treat the restriction as 
nonjurisdictional.’”224 
 
Part of the reason it currently matters so much whether a 
defect is jurisdictional or merits-based is that jurisdictional 
defects can cause a case to be dismissed even after trial.  But if 
the treatment of jurisdictional defects came more into line with 
that of other defects, courts and scholars would not have to 
determine where the dividing line falls between jurisdictional 
and nonjurisdictional defects.  Therefore, this Article’s thesis 
has far-reaching benefits for the civil justice system. 
 
222. Id. at 508 (The pretrial order “did not list among ‘Contested Issues 
of Fact’ or ‘Contested Legal Issues’ the question whether [the employer] had 
the requisite number of employees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  Nor was the 
issue raised at any other point pretrial or at trial.”). 
223. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (2015). 
224. Id. at 1632 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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One important purpose of the rules governing civil 
lawsuits is to help cases move smoothly and efficiently through 
the system.225  If our rules governing civil lawsuits become 
overly complex and riddled with exceptions, they fail to fulfill a 
basic need of our civil justice system.  Cases should generally 
be decided on the merits, not on technicalities of procedure. 
Our current framework for handling subject-matter 
jurisdiction objections does not serve the needs of our civil 
justice system.  It is time to jettison our false and exception-
riddled rhetoric regarding subject-matter jurisdiction’s 
nonwaivability and embrace the view the ALI so presciently 
saw nearly fifty years ago: statutory subject-matter jurisdiction 
defects should be deemed waived if not raised prior to trial or 
disposition on the merits.  That analysis should then be 
expanded from statutory subject-matter jurisdiction defects to 
constitutional defects.  That is, constitutional subject-matter 
jurisdiction defects should be deemed waived if not raised 
within those same timeframes. 
This proposal has significant consequences.  
Approximately 500 cases a year will clearly benefit from this 
new treatment.  These cases will be allowed to proceed to 
resolution, thus avoiding unnecessary sunk costs, and will 
receive a more uniform and predictable disposition.  And the 
analysis will be simplified in the thousands of other cases in 
which courts wrestled with subject-matter-based issues, but 
ultimately did not dismiss the cases.  Nor should this proposal 
cause any significant heartburn.  Indeed, treating subject-
matter jurisdiction in this way will accord with how our system 
currently treats other alleged constitutional infirmities. 
Jurisdictional waiver should be expanded to cover 
constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction defects that have not 
been raised by the time trial commences or there is a 
disposition on the merits.  Waiver will enhance the smooth and 
 
225. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, 
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
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efficient workings of our civil justice system, ensure that 
parties and courts do not become bogged down in categorizing 
subject-matter jurisdiction as constitutional versus statutory, 
bring our treatment of constitutional subject-matter 
jurisdiction in line with our treatment of several other 
constitutional doctrines, and serve as a roadmap for the 
treatment of other quasi-jurisdictional doctrines. 
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